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ANGLO-AMERICAN CONCEPTIONS OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND 
THE REFORM OF JAPANESE LEGAL EDUCATION: CREATING A VIRTUOUS 
CIRCLE?
By KIM ECONOMIDES∗
IN THIS article I describe how ethics and the professional responsibilities of lawyers have become 
increasingly prominent in debates on the future of mainstream legal education in Anglo-American 
and other common law jurisdictions. How are these debates in the West impacting on the current 
reform of Japanese legal education and,  vice versa, could these reforms influence developments 
here? My observations build on those made during a previous visit to Japan when I delivered a 
lecture on ethical legal education.1 Now, a decade on, I am encouraged to see that real progress is 
being made with widening participation and the implementation of liberalising reforms designed not 
only to introduce an ethical perspective into the training of modern Japanese lawyers but that other 
educational  models,  including  clinical  legal  education  and  developments  in  simulation-based 
learning, are also under active consideration by Japanese reformers.2 Yet it is with some irony that 
virtual  learning environments (VLEs) recently developed in the UK, but  modeled on Japanese 
computer games technology, are being re-cycled and exported back to Japan along with ethical 
perspectives that are such an ingrained part of traditional Japanese legal consciousness (ho-ishiki)3 
and social responsibility. If Japanese reformers feel they may have something to learn from foreign 
adaptations of their indigenous homegrown practices might it also be true that reformers here could 
learn from latest Japanese developments, thus creating a virtuous circle? I review these converging 
trends that confirm my belief that ethical perspectives very soon will become, if indeed they have 
not done so already, part of a global “new core” centered on legal ethics that lies at the heart of 
modern legal education and practice.
 Professor of Legal Ethics, School of Law, University of Exeter, UK. This is a revised version of a keynote address 
delivered in March 2005 at the Osaka International Conference Centre to a conference organised by the Kwansei 
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Order of a Changing Society Tokyo, Harvard University Press & Tuttle, 1964. See also S. Miyazawa, (1987) “Taking 
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The Fall and Rise of Ethics in Western Legal Education
Ethics and the professional responsibility of lawyers has become an increasingly prominent theme in 
Anglo-American legal education over the past two decades. On both sides of the Atlantic there has 
been growing interest in “the law of lawyering” and an awareness of the need and possibility of 
teaching  ethics  to  future  lawyers.4 Following  Watergate,  the  ethical  responsibilities  of  legal 
professionals has become relatively well established - even if not necessarily well-taught - in the 
United States and, more recently, in the United Kingdom serious efforts have been made to provide 
a foundation for the academic study of professional legal ethics.5 Over the past decade the United 
Kingdom has seen a small group of law teachers challenge dominant positivistic approaches that for 
generations has excluded serious academic analysis of lawyers’ ethics.6 The aim of this group has 
been to try to persuade all stakeholders with an interest in legal education to accept that meaningful 
ethical discussion can and should feature more prominently in contemporary legal education. Some 
have suggested that for law schools to continue to fail to prepare their students for the ethical 
dilemmas they will inevitably confront in the early years of practice is tantamount to a failure of 
their own professional responsibility as teachers.7 But the debate on the ethical content of legal 
education touches all stages of the educational continuum relevant to the formation of professional 
character ranging from the introduction of citizenship (including human rights law) in the national 
school  curriculum8,  to  the  undergraduate law degree, through to  the  vocational  stage  of  legal 
education and finally continuing professional development.9 
4.
 
See  K.  Economides  (1999),  “Learning  the  Law  of  Lawyering”,  Current  Legal  Problems 
1999,Vol.52, ed M.D.A.Freeman, Oxford, OUP, pp. 392-418.
54.See  K.  Economides  (1999),  “Learning  the  Law  of  Lawyering”,  Current  Legal  Problems 
1999,Vol.52, ed M.D.A.Freeman, Oxford, OUP, pp. 392-418.
 See, eg, D.L.Rhode (1995) “Into the Valley of Ethics: Professional Responsibility and Educational Reform” Vol. 58 
Law and Contemporary Problems p. 139. In 1998 an international journal Legal Ethics was launched in the UK. See 
also K. Economides (ed.), Ethical Challenges to Legal Education and Conduct, Oxford, Hart.1998, chap. 11.
6 For  an  excellent  recent  review  see  D.  Nicolson  (2005)  “Making  Lawyers  Moral?  Ethical  Codes  and  Moral 
Character” Vol. 25:4 Legal Studies, pp. 601-626.
7 See K. Economides and J. Webb (2000) “Do Law Schools Care About Law Students and Legal Values?” Vol.3:1 
Legal Ethics, pp.1-9.
8 See activities of the Public Legal Education Group set up by the Citizenship Foundation and the Civil Justice Council 
to promote awareness of the legal system amongst young people. Two projects are under way: “The first involves the 
development of a pilot scheme matching individual volunteer lawyers with schools to assist in supporting teachers in 
delivering the Citizenship programme to young people. Anecdotal evidence shows that in some areas, teaching staff 
may need support from the legal industry to provide a more effective experience for young people. Urban and rural 
schools will be involved and the scheme will be evaluated by the Citizenship Foundation for its effectiveness and 
benefit to teachers, schools and the young people concerned. The second project that is longer term involves collating 
of the existing research regarding the need for a cohesive programme of public legal education in England and Wales, 
and an umbrella organisation to oversee the direction of such a programme. It is envisaged that any system of public 
legal education would not be limited to young people, but would seek to include people of all ages and backgrounds, 
and would be aimed at promoting inclusion in society and greater understanding of civil legal issues affecting the 
population.” See further: http://www.civiljusticecouncil.gov.uk/493.htm 
9 See work of the Ethics Education Forum that was set up by the Law Society in 2004 in the context of a major review 
of vocational training – the Training Framework Review (TFR) - to inform policy on how ethics should be introduced 
throughout the educational continuum. See J. Webb and A. Fancourt, (2004) “The Law Society’s Training Framework 
Review: On the Straight and Narrow or Long and Winding Road?”  Vol.38:3 Law Teacher, pp. 293-325, at p.310-11 
   The ethical dimension has also surfaced in other common law jurisdictions beyond the Anglo-
American systems (notably New Zealand, Australia, Canada) that have already introduced ethics 
into their law curricula.10 New Zealand and Australian law schools are playing a leading role in 
examining the place of ethics in legal education and hosting international conferences that aim to 
carry these educational debates both further and deeper.11 Similar debates are getting under way in 
Latin America and other parts of Asia - eg the South Pacific, India, Korea and Taiwan – and so Japan 
is  therefore by  no  means alone  amongst Australasian  countries  in  thinking  about  the  ethical 
dimension to modern legal education.12 And this issue is also attracting increasing attention in the 
civil law systems throughout Europe and also at the transnational level of EU law.13 Although legal 
ethics are now coming of age it would be wrong to think that this topic has only recently been 
discovered; in fact it would be far more accurate to say that legal ethics has been ‘re-discovered’.
   It is therefore important to place this current trend in an historical as well as global context. One 
might be forgiven for thinking that legal ethics is a recent discovery, and in a sense it is, but it also to 
be found at the root of the western legal tradition.14 The question “Can Justice be Taught?” is of 
course profoundly philosophical and one that was also asked by the Ancient Greeks.15 It is worth 
recalling the origins of western legal education in which law and morals were fused within an oral 
tradition and that legal education, in any systematic sense, is a relatively recent phenomenon. In 
ancient Greece and  Rome  there  existed  some  formal training  in  advocacy (moral  and  legal) 
supporting the establishment of a professional class of persons with legal expertise but this class was 
not  a  profession as  such and early forms of  legal  education  were delivered primarily through 
observation and training acquired by serving as an apprentice to a legal consultant (jurisprudent) 
rather than through formal academic study. Prior to law reporting legal texts were for many centuries 
quite rare, which meant that the art of rhetoric inevitably formed the ‘core’ of early legal education. 
Gradually, however, as texts on both law and custom became more common, and records started to 
10 See D. Webb (2002) ”Ethics as a Compulsory Element of Qualifying Law Degrees: Some Modest Expectations” 
Vol. 4:2 Legal Ethics, pp. 109-126 (on New Zealand); M. A. Noone and J. Dickson (2002) “Teaching Towards a New 
Professionalism: Challenging Law Students to Become Ethical  Lawyers” Vol.  4:2  Legal Ethics,  pp.  127-145 (on 
Australia).  On  recent  Canadian  developments  that  incorporate  an  economic  perspective  on  legal  ethics  –  or 
‘ethinomics’  -  see:  R.  Graham,  Legal  Ethics:  Theories,  Cases  and  Professional  Regulation Toronto:  Edmond 
Montgomery, 2004.
11 See K. Economides and J.  Webb (2002) “Teaching Ethics and Professionalism: A Lesson from the Antipodes” 
Vol.4:2  Legal Ethics,  pp.91-94.  For an accounts  of  the  First International Conference on Lawyers’ Ethics see:  S. 
Nelson, (2004) “Reflections from the International  Conference on Legal Ethics from Exeter” Vol.7  Legal Ethics, 
pp.159-166.  A follow-up international  Legal  Ethics  Colloquium was held in  February 2005 at  the University  of 
Canterbury  in  Christchurch,  New  Zealand  and  the  Second International Conference  on  Lawyers’ Ethics  met  in 
Auckland, New Zealand  in 2006. See L.Haller (2006) “Professional Ethics and Personal Integrity: Report from the 
International  Conference  on  Legal  Ethics,  Auckland,  New  Zealand”  Vol.9:1  Legal  Ethics pp.  13-15.  A third 
international conference on legal ethics will be held in 2008 on the Gold Coast, Australia.
12  See chapters on South Pacific and Brazil in Economides  supra n.5. See also: H. Kim, (2002) “In Search of the 
‘Soul of Professionalism’: The Case of Legal Education Reform Efforts in South Korea” Vol. 5 Legal Ethics, pp. 27-
33  (on  South  Korea);  J.  Gandhi  (ed.) Power  and Passion:  Study  of  Socio-Ethical Concerns  of  the  Lawyers 
(forthcoming,  Gyan  Publishing,  Delhi,  2008)  (on  India);  and  Su-Po  Kao  (2004)  “The  Legal  Profession  as  an 
Intermediary: A Framework on Lawyers in Society” Vol. 7:1 Legal Ethics, pp. 39-53 (on Taiwan).
13 See  K.  Raes  & B.  Claessens  (eds.)  Towards a new Ethical Framework for a Legal Profession in Transition? 
Proceedings of the European conference on ethics and the legal profession, held at Ghent University (Belgium) on 25  
and 26 October 2001 Intersentia, Antwerp, 2002.
14 See H. J Berman,  Law and Revolution. The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition, Cambridge, Harvard Univ. 
Press, 1983 and G. Piva and F. Spantigati (eds) Nuovi Moti Per La Formazione Del Diritto Padova, CEDAM, 1988.
15.See C. Gill in Economides supra, n.5. See further See A. Gutman, Can Virtue be Taught?” (1993) 45 Stanford Law 
Rev., p. 1759
be kept of court decisions, this dominant oral tradition was supplanted with a new written tradition 
created by full-time law teachers dedicated to establishing and communicating a literature on, about 
and for law. 
    Legal education started out by asking universal questions linking legal rules, morals and justice 
and only much later were these elements separated, with some discarded altogether. Early legalists 
were certainly not parochial in their outlook and did not draw sharp distinctions between law and 
morality, nor did they fail to consider the relationship with other professions and disciplines. If one 
draws a distinction between legal education and training it could be argued that with the passage of 
time the latter has steadily displaced the former with the result that the boundaries of legal thought 
have been shrinking and the legal mind has become more introverted and absorbed with technical 
ephemeral rules rather than fundamental values. Roman law, canon law and international law – the 
ius commune – was the focal point of legal study in the medieval universities on the continent of 
Europe and  these  legal  sources  formed the  basis  of  a  common  transnational  legal  language 
facilitating trade between commercial classes.  The English common law was an exception to this 
trend and although to some extent influenced by this ius commune its impact in England was greatly 
reduced by the early development of an indigenous and quite sophisticated legal culture relatively 
insulated from Roman law.16  Legal education in medieval England was provided by the Inns of 
Court that organised apprenticeships involving both shadowing practitioners and practical exercises 
– and of course dining - within a closed, and almost monastic, community. With the advent of 
printing, legal texts started to supplant, but not replace, these informal methods of socialisation. 
Organised legal education for solicitors did not commence until Sir William Blackstone started to 
deliver his famous lectures on English law at Oxford in the 1750s and it was not until the Victorian 
era, with visionaries such as John Austin, Jeremy Bentham and Sir Henry Maine, that university 
liberal legal education became established at University College London and beyond, including the 
Council of Legal Education which was set up in 1852.17 Bentham’s legacy to the modern legal 
system was to open up the possibility of subjecting law to rational inquiry and he greatly facilitated 
the creation and establishment of a science of law. However, the moral foundations underpinning 
and informing his positivism can easily be overlooked.18 
   Two points are worth emphasising about  the history and character of Anglo-American legal 
education in the context of ethical debates now taking place in Japanese law schools and elsewhere: 
there is nothing particularly new or original about either: a) linking law with morality; or b) offering 
practical training in legal rhetoric – or what today would be covered in activities labelled variously 
as ‘advocacy’, ‘mooting’ or ‘clinical legal education’ - for each approach has been present if not 
always visible within western legal education since its inception even though subsequently both 
practices have enjoyed a chequered history and, in more recent times, are often absent from the 
formal and positivistic  training in ‘legal science’ offered by mainstream curricula found in  the 
majority of modern law schools.19
16 See R.C. van Caenegem, The Birth of the English Common Law (Cambridge, CUP, 1973)
17 See R. Cocks,  Foundations of the Modern Bar London, Sweet & Maxwell,1983 and Sir Henry Maine : a study in 
Victorian jurisprudence Cambridge, CUP, 1988.
18 L. Campos Boralevi,  Bentham and the Oppressed Berlin, 1984). On the ethical foundations of positivism see, T. 
Campbell, The Legal Theory of Ethical Positivism Aldershot, 1996); N. MacCormick (1989)‘The Ethics of Legalism’ 
Vol. 2 Ratio Juris 184.
19  It is worth noting that some clinical legal educators perceive clinical legal education as having wider functions, 
especially given the increasing diversity of models of clinical legal education with the potential inclusion of activities 
such as Innocence Projects, law reform projects and Street Law clinics alongside more ‘traditional’ advice and/or 
representation clinics.
The Poverty of Contemporary (Positivistic) Legal Education
      
While  it  may  well  be  true  that  legal  education  has  certain  shortcomings when  it  comes  to 
communicating a deep sense of professional responsibility to future members of the legal profession 
it must be recognised that this is not the only, or even the primary, reason for exploring the ethical 
dimension to legal practice within law schools. The driving force behind much current reform effort 
common  across  many  jurisdictions  and  professions,  particularly  when  led  by  professional 
associations, is adverse public reaction to professionals who may no longer be seen as trustworthy. 
Ethics may be viewed as a means to boost the public image of lawyers whose standing may have 
been undermined by the ubiquitous lawyer joke and statistics revealing increasing numbers of 
lawyer complaints and defalcations. The case for educational reform has more to do with making 
lawyers ‘good’ in a moral sense rather than technically competent in the handling (or manipulation) 
of legal rules; and as law teachers our aim should be to develop and reinforce understanding of the 
public and professional role of the lawyer in a modern society that reaches beyond the immediate 
obligations owed to the private client.20 Lawyers everywhere – whether in public or private practice, 
rural or global corporate law firms - need a better balanced, mature and more responsible approach 
to their professional duties and a better understanding of how these duties connect (or conflict) with 
their private morality. 
   A central mission of the modern law school must therefore be to create good lawyers capable of 
carrying out what Damon has called “good work”.21 A key decision for any law school is how to 
identify, construct and promote its own particular conception of the ‘good lawyer’ from amongst the 
many competing conceptions that are available and to make explicit the underlying ethical, moral 
and legal values it seeks to promote. Ethics are of course already present in the formal and informal 
law curriculum but are not always made explicit. It is therefore arguable that law teachers have a 
responsibility to help their students see the various applications of the skills that are imparted to 
them and to help them make informed choices about where, for whom and how they will practice 
law in the future.22  Sadly this does not yet seem to have been accepted within mainstream legal 
education and moral debate, if it is found at all, remains more often than not confined to the ghetto 
of  an optional course in  jurisprudence.  While  leading legal philosophers such as  Hart, Finnis, 
Dworkin - and others - have sought either to clarify, collapse or redraw this boundary between law 
and  morality within  jurisprudence, within  the  remainder of  the  undergraduate curriculum law 
students continue to be taught (at least implicitly) that they must maintain this barrier if they wish to 
acquire the professional knowledge and skills  of the ‘good lawyer’.23 Empirical evidence from 
20 See Economides part 3 supra n.5 and Nicolson, supra n. 6
21 See R. Wasserstrom (1984)”Legal Education and the Good Lawyer” Vol. 34 Jor. Legal Education p. 155. Professor 
Damon in his paper “Recent Research on Good Work and the Development of Young Adults” defines “good work” as 
work that is both ‘excellent’ and ‘ethical’: “To be excellent, the work must be successful according to the standards of 
the  field.  To  be  ethical,  the  work  must  be  socially  responsible  and  conform to  standards  such  as  honesty  and 
integrity.”(p.2). See further: A.Colby and W. Damon  Some Do care: Contemporary Lives of Moral Commitment  New 
York, Free Press, 1992.  Interestingly recent developments in the UK that seek to apply quality assurance standards to 
legal aid work recognise that ‘good’ (or competent) work need not necessarily be ‘excellent’. Peer review assessments 
may produce one of five ratings for the performance of legal aid work: (1) Excellence; (2) Competence Plus; (3) 
Threshold Competence; (4) Below Competence; and (5) Failure in Performance. See Legal Services Commission, 
Independent Peer Review of Legal Advice and Legal Work. A Consultation Paper  (April, 2005) pp.37-39. See further 
M.Martin, Meaningful Work. Rethinking Professional Ethics Oxford, OUP, 2000.
22 See A.C. Hutchinson (1998) “Taking it Personally: Legal Ethics and Client Selection” Vol.1 Legal Ethics p.168.
23 See C. Sampford, (1998) ”What’s a Lawyer Doing in a Nice Place like this? Lawyers and Ethical Life” Vol.1:1 
Legal Ethics p. 35. Note also Cotterrell’s comments on the tasks of the standard jurisprudence course: ‘…in trying to 
portray contemporary law theoretically in its complexity as experienced by lawyers and others, we need a place for 
several jurisdictions confirms that positivistic legal education reinforces cynicism rather than respect 
for legal values.24
   There has however been growing unease amongst  both academic lawyers and  practitioners 
regarding the cynical attitudes found not only within but also toward the legal profession. Legal 
Education reviews in several countries have therefore followed the Lord Chancellor’s  Advisory 
Committee on Legal Education & Conduct (ACLEC) in making the case for strengthening  the 
liberal credentials of the law degree by supporting the case for introducing awareness of ethical 
perspectives, if not mandatory ethical instruction, into mainstream legal education.25 The issue today 
in Japan, as elsewhere, is not so much whether but rather when, how, and how far, this ethical 
awareness should be introduced in order to supplement and hopefully remedy shortcomings of an 
overly narrow positivistic legal education.26 
   
The Promise of an Ethical Legal Education
In this section I wish briefly to survey some emerging themes in the ethical education of lawyers. 
My aim is not to evaluate the approaches that may deliver increased ethical awareness amongst 
future lawyers but rather to present  these as choices that could inform curriculum reform. The 
practical problem for legal educators is to identify available resources and decide which approach, 
or combination of approaches, is most likely to fit best with the overall curriculum and support long-
term educational  goals.27 It  is  perhaps worth noting  that  the  legal  profession  is  not  alone in 
considering how best to introduce ethics into the curriculum.28
Formal Approaches
aspiration too.  It ought to be part of the task of jurisprudence to test – indeed to breaking point – law’s ability to 
embody reason and principle, to connect with deeply felt moral aspirations, and to produce justice in many different 
senses of that term.’ R. Cotterrell, ’Jurisprudence of Reason and Jurisprudence of Fiat’ in P. Birks (ed.) Examining the 
Law Syllabus. Beyond the Core Oxford, 1993, ch.16, at p.89.
24 K. Economides, “Cynical legal studies” in Educating for Justice: Social Values and Legal Education  eds. J.Cooper 
and L.Trubek, Dartmouth, 1997, pp. 26-38.
25 ACLEC, First report on legal education and training, London, 1996 para 1.19-20. Considered in B. Hepple, (1996) 
‘The renewal of the liberal law degree’ Vol. 55Cambridge L.J. 470,484; H.W.Arthurs,’Half a league onward: The 
report of the Lord Chancellor’s Advisory Committee on Legal Education and Conduct’ (1997)31 The Law Teacher 1; 
J. Webb (1988) “Ethics for lawyers or ethics for citizens? New directions for legal education.” Vol. 25 J. Law and 
Society  p.  134.  See  also  reviews  of  legal  education  in  other  jurisdictions::  R.  MacCrate,  Legal  Education and 
Professional Development - An Educational Continuum. Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: 
Narrowing  the  Gap. Chicago,  1992;  D.  Pearce,  Australian  Law  Schools:  A  Discipline  Assessment  for  the 
Commonwealth Tertiary Commission Australian,1987; W.B.Cotter,  Professional Responsibility Instruction in Canada: 
A  Coordinated  Curriculum for  Legal  Education Montreal,  1992;  H.  Franken,  Een  eigen  richting  voor  het 
recht...Eindrapport  van  de  Verkenningscommissie  Rechtsgeleerdheid. (A  sense  of  direction...The  future  of  legal 
research in the Netherlands) Final Report of the Legal Education Review Commission Leiden, 1997) pp. 55-56. For an 
overview of these education reviews see: A. Boon (2002) “Ethics in Legal Education and Training: Four Reports, 
Three Jurisdictions and a Prospectus” Vol.5, Legal Ethics pp.34-67
26 J. Chapman, (2002) “Why teach Legal Ethics to Undergraduates?” Vol.5 Legal Ethics pp. 68-89.
27 See C. Parker (2004) “ A Critical Morality for Lawyers: Four Approaches to Lawyers Ethics” Vol. 30  Monash 
University Law Rev. p.49; M. Robertson (2005) “Challenges in the Design of Legal Ethics Learning Systems: An 
Educational Perspective” Vol.8:2 Legal Ethics pp. 221-239. See also C. Parker and A. Evans, Inside Lawyers’ Ethics 
Cambridge, CUP, 2007. 
28 See S. Illingworth, Approaches to Ethics in Higher Education: Teaching Ethics Across the Curriculum University of 
Leeds, 2004.
An obvious and common starting point  for an understanding of  ethical standards of  the legal 
profession is to focus on the rules contained in the professional code of conduct. While the code 
may, as with a constitution, have an educative side effect its primary purpose is regulatory. It tells 
members in simple straightforward language what they can and cannot do but does not deal with the 
complexities of why and how they should act in a professional manner. This may or may not be left 
to supplementary ‘guidance’. At present the professional code forms the basis of formal instruction 
offered future lawyers, whether these be trainees from within or qualified lawyers transferring from 
outside a given jurisdiction, and the most common approach aims at ensuring there is an adequate 
basic knowledge of professional duties in place as well as the capacity to identify relevant rules and 
issues arising in the context of the lawyer-client relationship.29 The vocational courses in many 
jurisdictions typically focus on the ‘micro duties’ found in the rules of professional conduct (eg. the 
retainer,  fees,  conflict  of  interest,  confidentiality,  professional  negligence,  duties  to  the  court, 
professional undertakings and money laundering), as well as issues of client care, especially in the 
lawyer-client relationship, and other obligations arising out of managing accounts and financial 
services regulation, professional relations with other lawyers and non-lawyers. Increasingly there is 
also an attempt to move beyond these rules enshrined in the professional code in order to consider 
‘ethical  context’.30 Before  and after  the  vocational  course, coverage of  professional  standards 
remains patchy and inconsistent, and during these courses the approach commonly adopted appears 
to be dogmatic and uncritical.31 Lawyers are taught that they must comply with, rather than question 
or criticise, their code. As Nicolson has pointed out, professional  codes are both important yet 
insufficient: and they have an ambivalent influence in that they may either nurture or detract from 
the development of the lawyer’s professional moral character.32 In the future we may therefore 
require a different kind of ‘contextual’ code if we are to take seriously the task of making lawyers 
‘moral’.33 While the professional code should not be ignored it is also clear that, in isolation, it offers 
an inadequate foundation for legal professionalism. There is a further need for some kind of context 
- whether derived from theory, practice or the humanities – in order to put ethical flesh on legal 
bones and expose the latent dilemmas that only really become apparent once it is recognised that 
rules of conduct contained in the code often collide. At this point external guidance drawing upon 
human and legal experience is required to assist the process of ethical decision-making.
Theoretical Approaches
If the code provides an obvious starting point for studying professional responsibility another point 
worth making is that, as with theory itself, ethics cannot be avoided and the only real choice left the 
educator is  to  decide  whether to  make the  ethical  values  and theory latent  in  the  curriculum 
explicit.34 University legal education provides an ideal opportunity to examine underlying theoretical 
perspectives  on  professional  responsibility  and  it  is  now  widely  appreciated that  inculcating 
29 At present about a quarter of all new admissions into the solicitors profession are transfers from overseas, the Bar, 
FILEX, justices clerks or other routes.
30 See S. Bullock, Ethics Education Forum: Report into Ethics Training in Other Jurisdictions, Law Society, London, 
2004.
31 See eg. W. H. Simon (1991) ‘The trouble with legal ethics’ Jor. of Legal Education 65.  See also Simon’s study 
analysing these problems and proposing solutions:  The Practice of Justice. A Theory of Lawyers’ Ethics Cambridge, 
Ma.,1998) reviewed by T. Campbell (1998) “Moral Autonomy for Lawyers: A Review of William H Simon” Vol. 1 
Legal Ethics p. 201.
32 D. Nicolson, supra n. 6.
33 Ibid.at pp. 620-624.
34 C. Menkel-Meadow (1991) ”Can a law teacher avoid teaching legal ethics?” Vol. 41 Jor.Legal Education at p.3.
professionalism need not be left entirely to the vocational courses and apprenticeship. As Sir Bob 
Hepple observes:
The teaching of professional ethics and conduct cannot simply be left to vocational 
courses or in-service training.  Students have to imbibe a sense of the obligations 
which lawyers owe not simply to their own clients or employers but to society as a 
whole: in maintaining and improving fundamental democratic values, including the 
protection of human rights and the defense of individuals against the abuse of 
public and private power,  as well as providing legal services for disadvantaged 
sections of the population35
Ethical theory – whether Kantian, consequentialist, aretaic, postmodern or feminist in outlook – can 
provide a valuable analytical tool with which to understand and dissect ethical dilemmas within a 
philosophical context.  36 On the  other  hand, theory alone probably will  not  produce definitive 
answers to practical problems confronting lawyers in practice and, by opening up endless further 
choices to consider, could simply confuse and delay practical decision-making. Furthermore, there is 
no  conclusive  empirical  evidence  to  suggest  that  ethics  education  actually  produces  ‘good 
lawyers’.37
Clinical Approaches
Although not part of mainstream legal education in the United Kingdom, clinical legal education 
clearly has considerable potential to offer law students the opportunity to observe, practice and 
reflect on ethics in action.38 This approach concentrates on the acquisition of legal skill through the 
practical application  of  legal  knowledge. Experience from the  United  States is  on  the  whole 
encouraging and it would appear that exposure to clinical experience may have a profound and 
lasting impact in terms of establishing not only key skills but also core legal values and ethical 
commitment amongst future members of the legal profession.39 Pro bono initiatives are therefore 
important not  only because they may provide legal services to those who might otherwise not 
receive them; they also offer valuable opportunities to young lawyers to acquire professional skills 
and a sense of responsibility that will stay with them for the rest of their careers. This could be an 
important counterweight to the cynicism that pervades much of modern legal education.40  One 
35 Hepple, supra n. 25. See also R. Cranston, How Law Works. The Machinery and Impact of Civil Justice Oxford, OUP, 
2006, pp.207-208. But see H.W. Arthurs “Why Canadian Law Schools Do Not Teach Legal Ethics” in Economides 
supra n.5 chap.6.
36 See, eg. C. Gill “Law and Ethics in Classical Thought” supra n.5. chap.1. L.P. Pojman, Ethical Theory: Classical 
and Contemporary Readings,  Wadsworth Publishing,  4th edn.,  2001.  D.  Nicolson and J.Webb,  Professional Legal 
Ethics: Critical Interrogations Oxford, OUP, 1999, Chap.2.
37 See Arthurs supra n. 35. M. Robertson and K. Tranter (2007) “Grounding legal ethics learning in social scientific 
studies of lawyers at work” Legal Ethics (forthcoming).
38 See J. Webb (1996) “Inventing the Good: A Prospectus for Clinical Education and the Teaching of Legal Ethics in 
England “ Vol.  30  The Law Teacher,  p.  270;  D.A.  Schon,  (1995) “Educating the Reflective Practitioner”  Vol.  2 
Clinical Law Rev. p. 231; C. Maughan and J. Webb Lawyering Skills and the Legal Process, Cambridge, CUP, 2nd edn, 
2005, chap.6;  J.  Webb (1998) “Ethics for Lawyers or Ethics for Citizens? New Directions for Legal Education” 
Vol.25:1 Journal of Law and Society pp. 134–150.
39 See MacCrate supra n.24; E.B. Spaeth, Jr.; J. G. Perry; P. B. Wachs (1995) “Teaching Legal Ethics: Exploring the 
Continuum” Vol. 58 (3/4) Law and Contemporary Problems, pp. 153-172; But compare: R Condlin, The Moral Failure 
of Clinical Legal Education Center for Philosophy and Public Policy, University of Maryland, 1981.
40 See K. Economides, supra n.24.
recent  development  is  not  to  use  live  clients  but  rather  to  create  simulated virtual  learning 
environments through which law students can experience the lawyer-client and other relationships.41
Humanistic Approaches
Another approach to communicating the nature and essence of professional ethics to future lawyers 
is draw upon literary sources and other representations of legal work found in popular culture such 
as film and television.42 The broad aim here is to use narrative as a means of developing ethical 
judgment. Law students are expected to analyse stories as case studies in which they can recognize 
and resolve ethical dilemmas found in legal practice. Literature and film may thus provide a kind of 
laboratory in which to examine professional responsibility.43 These approaches are valuable in that 
they can expose tensions between professional and personal morality but, on the other hand, there is 
a risk of severe distortion of the reality of the legal process in the interest of providing popular 
entertainment. These approaches can often be used in conjunction with, or as supplements to, the 
other formal, theoretical and clinical approaches described above.
Legal Education Reform in Japan
The Justice System Reform Council of Japan initiated something of a ‘quiet revolution’ when it 
recommended in 2001 a fundamental reform of Japanese legal education that by April 2004 had 
resulted in the establishment of 68 new graduate-level law schools modelled on those found in the 
United States.44 These reforms could create a far more diverse legal profession and should enhance 
access to justice for Japanese citizens. But these reforms will also impact on the content and delivery 
of legal education: as from April 2007 these 68 new law schools will be free to experiment with 
innovative curriculum reform that previously was not possible, while some institutions have already 
been piloting simulated experiential programmes that could nurture a  range of lawyering skills 
including ethical  awareness.45 A select  number of  these  new law schools  are  already closely 
monitoring foreign experience in order to identify promising educational practices found in western 
law schools that might be imported in order to raise ethical, educational and practice standards in 
Japan.46 Questions arise as to whether these foreign imports are likely to take root in Japanese legal 
culture and whether this culture has anything to offer those interested in reforming legal education in 
41 Supra n.2.
42 See P. Brooks and P. Gewirtz  Law’s Stories: Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law Yale Univ. Press, New Haven & 
London, 1996.
43 See, eg, T. Dare’s discussion of “To Kill a Mockingbird” in Economides supra, n.5 chap.3. See also: C. Menkel-
Meadow (2000) “Forward Telling Stories in School: Using Case Studies and Stories to Teach Legal Ethics” Vol.69 
Fordham Law Rev.p. 787; R.C. Cramton and S.P. Koniak (1996) “Rule, Story, and Commitment in the Teaching of 
Legal Ethics” Vol.38 William & Mary Law Rev.p. 145; L.G.Webster, (1991) “Telling Stories: The Spoken Narrative 
Tradition in Criminal Defense Discourse” Vol. 42 Mercer Law Rev. p.553. 
44 There are 92 universities with an undergraduate law faculty and approximately 50,000 law-major undergraduate 
students in Japan. Among those 92 universities, 71 universities and one brand new university applied for opening a 
law school in 2004. Consequently,  68 law schools were approved and 4 failed to obtain approval. Nine selected 
universities all applied but one failed.
45 S. Brown, (2005) “A True Meeting of Minds: A Conference Report from Japan”, Vol.8:1 Legal Ethics, pp. 12-15.
46 Japanese law schools have been visiting a number of foreign law schools in the US, Australia and the UK to observe 
developments relating to simulated learning and clinical legal practice. In February 2007 UK law schools in Glasgow, 
Northumbria,  Warwick and London were visited by a team from the Kwansei Gakuin University Law School in 
Osaka.
the West.47 For example, one US law teacher teaching in Hokkaido reports a number of obstacles in 
bringing western-style ethics to the Japanese, whether through simulations or clinical experience:
During my stay in Japan, I discovered that discussions of ethical education with my 
colleagues at Hokkaido University invariably caused concern. Perhaps my choice 
of words, more than the concept of ethical education, generated much anxiety. For 
many  of  my  colleagues,  a  frightening  legacy  remains  from  the  educational 
indoctrination methods used in Imperial Japan, particularly those relating to the 
1890 Imperial Rescript on Education. For others, there appears to be a reluctance to 
allow  faculty  members  to  paternalistically  impose  their  own  moral  views  on 
university students who have already completed their  development into adults. 
However, such fears reflect a misunderstanding of the nature of ethical education 
suggested here. The goal is not imposition of a dogmatic pedagogy of what is right 
and wrong. Rather, the first purpose is to introduce students to the inevitability of 
ethical quandaries arising in a conscientious career. Secondly, we should help them 
understand  their  own  conscience  of  what  might  be  right  and  wrong in  such 
situations. Finally, we must give them the intellectual tools necessary for coping 
with the challenges that they may face on those occasions.48
These goals are worth noting for very similar challenges confront those wishing to develop ethical 
awareness here in the West that should also include lawyers’ public and social duties:
Graduates of Japanese law schools are destined to become Japan’s government, 
business, and social leaders. How those persons will weigh the moral challenges of 
their time will create the base for the next generation's social order. The educational 
task  is  not  to  instruct  about  rules,  but  to  foster  a  mature awareness for  the 
challenges that may arise in our students’ futures. For example, we can discuss 
what one might do if directed by a superior to act illegally, such as to give a bribe. 
We might ask whether an act that is not clearly illegal can still be wrong, or what 
courses of action are available if one is not doing a questionable act, but instead 
discovers illegal or wrong actions being done by one’s colleagues or superiors? 
And, what might be the consequences of pursuing the various available options at 
that time? Ideally, students should come to understand their own values about these 
questions  and  that others may not view the world the same way. Then, if issues 
such as these arise for graduates in the future, they will be better prepared to assess 
the circumstances and choose a socially constructive path.49
This international experience raises two connected issues of fundamental importance for 
the future of legal education, both in Japan and the West. How should legal educators: (1) 
teach ethics without being overly paternalistic, yet at the same time remain sensitive to 
wider professional  and national cultures; and  (2) assist  the development of  individual 
47 On the problems of legal transplants, see generally, D. Nelken and J. Feest (eds), Adapting Legal Cultures Oxford, 
Hart, 2001; D. Nelken (2003) “Legal Transplants and Beyond: Of Disciplines and Metaphors” in Comparative Law 
for the 21st century, eds A. Harding and E. Orucu, Hague, Kluwer, 2003.
48 M..Levin,  “Legal  Education  for  the  Next  Generation:  Ideas  from  America” 
http://www.cmmi.gr.jp/effort/pdf/levin.pdf. pp.14-15. 
49 Ibid.p.15. See also M. A. Levin (2005) “Japan's New Law Schools: Elite, Cautious, Regional, and Idealist” Vol. 62 
Japanese Journal of Law and Society p. 139.
values and awareness of contrasting perspectives emanating from the ‘Other’? In my view 
law teachers need to respond by remaining constantly alert to the danger of promoting their 
own subjective beliefs at the expense of core professional values, whilst allowing students 
sufficient  autonomy  in  order  that  they  are  free  to  explore  their  own  independent 
understanding of  professional  values.50 In  Japan, given the  legal  system’s  positivistic 
Germanic roots and the dirigiste approach that still dominates the new post-baccalaureate 
law schools, far greater caution can be expected amongst law teachers who may well fear 
experimenting with normative values when teaching professional responsibility to adults. It 
therefore seems safe to predict that in Japan there will be a reluctance to engage with more 
advanced methods  advocated by  some  leading law teachers in  the  West.51 But  while 
significant cultural differences amongst lawyers in Japan and the West may well persist, we 
should not forget that there is also much that binds lawyers together wherever they happen 
to practice. Instead of concentrating on local and cultural differences, which inevitably will 
be emphasised in  skills and vocational training, and apprenticeship, academic teachers 
might focus first on the universal  values common to all  lawyers that are enshrined in 
formal codes.52 More needs to be done to communicate the nature and significance of core 
legal values. Thereafter, it should be possible to supplement these sources by introducing a 
variety  of  perspectives  drawing upon  theoretical, clinical  and  humanistic  approaches 
outlined earlier that might well be grounded in local legal cultures. At the same time it 
would be well to lower expectations about how far it is possible to influence the value 
systems of law students for the available empirical evidence suggests that law schools have 
only a limited impact wherever they venture beyond teaching rules.53 Nevertheless, it does 
matter that, as educators, we accept responsibility for our students and do all we can to 
point out to the next generation of lawyers where we think the right path to justice lies.54
50 See K.Economides, supra n.24 at p.33-34. 
51 Eg,.  D. L. Rhode, Professional Responsibility: Ethics by The Pervasive Method 2d. ed., 1995; E. W. Myers (1997) 
“Teaching Good and Teaching Well: Integrating Values With Theory and Practice “ Vol. 47 Jor. of Legal Education, p. 
401; D. N. Frenkel (2001) “On Trying to Teach Judgment”   Vol. 12  Legal Education Rev., p.19; D.Luban and M. 
Milleman, (1995) “Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times” Vol. 9 Georgetown. Jor. Legal Ethics, p.31.
52 See A. Boon and J.Flood (1999)  “Globalization of Professional Ethics? The Significance of Lawyers’ International 
Codes of Conduct”, Vol.2:1  Legal Ethics, pp. 29-57; H.W.Arthurs (1999) “A Global Code of Legal Ethics for the 
Transnational Legal Field”, Vol.2:1 Legal Ethics, pp. 59-69.
53 See n.37 supra and A. Evans and J. Palermo (2002) “Australian Law Students’ Perceptions of their Values: Interim 
Results in the First Year—2001—of a Three Year Empirical Assessment” Vol.5 Legal Ethics, pp.103; A. Evans and J. 
Palermo (2005) “Zero Impact: Are Lawyers’ Values Affected by Law School?” Vol. 8 Legal Ethics, p. 240. 
54K.Economides (2006) “The Road to Justice Revisited: Current Trends in Professional Legal Ethics”, Vol. 27:1 Recht 
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